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ABSTRACT
This paper uses an estimated demand system that accounts for heterogeneity to calculate and
compare the lost consumer surplus from a higher tax on gasoline, a tax on distance, or a subsidy for
buying a newer car. We introduce a view of cost-effectiveness that compares policies instead of
technologies. Each tax might induce some consumers to drive less, some to switch from two vehicles
to one, and some to buy a car instead of an SUV. Our model captures these behaviors. For each rate
of tax, we simulate the changes in all such choices and how the new choices affect emissions. We
also calculate the equivalent variation and subtract tax revenue to get deadweight loss. Finally, we
take the added deadweight loss over the additional abatement as the social marginal cost of












gan@eco.utexas.edu  1 
Cost Effective Policies to Reduce Vehicle Emissions 
To  compare  "cost-effectiveness"  of  different  abatement  methods,  many  studies 
estimate production or cost functions and plot the marginal cost curve for using each 
method to achieve more abatement.  Normally the cost is additional outlay by the firm 
(e.g. added equipment, process changes, or fuel switching).  Each method may have 
diminishing returns, however, so the marginal cost of abatement (MCA) may start at 
different  points  and  rise  at  different  rates.
1   Then  efficiency  requires  the  planner  to 
pursue each method to the point where all have the same MCA.  Or, as pointed out by 
Arthur  C.  Pigou  (1920),  an  emissions  tax  gives  incentive  for  firms  to  pursue  each 
method until its MCA equals the tax rate, which achieves the same efficiency. 
For vehicle emissions, the list of usual suspects similarly includes the purchase of 
pollution control equipment, process changes such as driving at low and uniform speeds, 
and fuel switching from leaded to unleaded gasoline and to cleaner fuels.  Perhaps the 
MCA curves for those techniques could all be plotted to undertake the same sort of 
analysis.    Yet  this  analysis  for  vehicle  emissions  faces  four  problems.    First,  the 
abatement  decisions  are  made  by  many  different  agents:  manufacturers  can  include 
equipment to achieve required rates for emissions per mile (EPM), but consumers get to 
choose whether to buy a car or sports utility vehicle (SUV), whether to drive at low or 
uniform speeds, and how many miles to drive.  Second, heterogeneity means that the 
efficient mix differs across drivers: some can switch from an SUV to a car, others can 
buy a new vehicle with low emission rate, others may change driving style, and still 
others could change driving amounts.  The planning solution is not feasible, and so 
                                                 
1 For the example of greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement, see Figures 20-21 of U.S. EPA (2001, p.23), 
where  the  highest  MCA  curve  is  for  US  CO2  emission  reduction,  followed  by  US  other  GHG 
reduction, US sequestration, and then other countries'  CO2, other GHG, and sequestration. 
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policy must rely on incentives.  Third, however, the tax on emissions is not feasible 
either, since the measurement technology is not yet available.
2  Fourth, while some of 
the costs of abatement are extra outlays for equipment included by manufacturers, or for 
the higher cost of cleaner fuel, many  costs would instead come in the form of lost 
consumer surplus from driving fewer miles and from driving in the "wrong" vehicle: a 
car instead of an SUV, or a newer car instead of an old car. 
This paper deals with all four of these issues: we use an estimated demand system 
that  accounts  for  heterogeneity  to  calculate  the  lost  consumer  surplus  from  feasible 
policies such as a higher tax on gasoline, a tax on distance, or a subsidy for buying a 
newer  car.
3   To  do  this,  we  introduce  a  somewhat  new  view  of  cost-effectiveness, 
comparing  policies  instead  of  technologies.    A  policy  such  as  the  gasoline  tax,  for 
example, might induce some consumers to drive less, some to switch from two vehicles 
to one, some to buy a car instead of an SUV, and some to do "all of the above".  Our 
model captures these behaviors.  For each rate of tax, we simulate the changes in all 
such choices and how the new choices affect emissions.  We also calculate the lost 
consumer  surplus,  or  equivalent  variation  (EV),  and  subtract  tax  revenue  to  get 
deadweight  loss  (DWL).    Finally,  we  take  the  added  DWL  over  the  additional 
abatement as the social marginal cost of abatement (MCA), and we plot this curve for 
several different tax policies. 
Current  policies  state  maximum  emission  rates  for  new  vehicles.    These  have 
                                                 
2 On-board  diagnostic  equipment  is  too  costly  because  millions  of  vehicles  would  need  to  be 
retrofitted (Winston Harrington et al., 1994).  Remote sensing is less expensive and can measure 
average emissions, but cannot distinguish emissions clearly enough to tax each car separately (Sierra 
Research, 1994).  And any tailpipe device would entirely miss evaporative emissions. 
 
3 Fullerton and Sarah West (2000) consider combinations of gas taxes and car taxes that maximize 
welfare when an emissions tax is not available, but they assume substitution elasticities and calibrate 
other parameters.  Here we use estimated parameters. 
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become more stringent over time, and they are more stringent for cars than for SUVs.
4  
We do not simulate changes in these mandates; indeed they are reflected in our data 
showing  how  newer  cars  have  lower  EPM  than  older  cars  or  SUVs.    Instead,  we 
simulate additional policies that would use incentives to get consumers to buy those 
newer cars or to reduce their miles. 
I. The Model 
Each consumer has a discrete choice about the number and types of vehicles and 
continuous choices about vehicle miles traveled (VMT).  To capture all such choices 
simultaneously,  and  the  way  all  such  choices  affect  emissions,  we  use  estimated 
parameters from Ye Feng, et al. (FFG, 2005).  In their model, each household first 
chooses the number of vehicles (0,1, or 2) and then for each vehicle chooses a car or 
SUV.  The result is six "bundles" (no vehicle, one car, two cars, one SUV, two SUVs, 
one of each).  We have no need to model the choice among hundreds of vehicle types, 
as in prior studies of manufacturer product differentiation.  All cars in a given year are 
made  to  meet  a  single  emission  rate  standard,  so  the  only  important  choices  for 
emissions are between car and SUV and the age of the vehicle.  We model age as a 
continuous choice and estimate the emission rates for cars of different age.  After the 
discrete choice among bundles, then, a two-vehicle household makes four continuous 
choices (the age of each vehicle and the miles to drive each vehicle).  The marginal 
price per mile is: 
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where  i  indexes the vehicle bundle,  pg  is the price of gasoline,  tg  is the gas tax in 
                                                 
4 For an overview of vehicle pollution policy, see Harrington and Virginia McConnell (2003). 
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dollars per gallon,  MPGi  is miles per gallon, and  EPMi  is grams of emissions per mile.  
The imposition of a distance tax  td  in dollars per mile would add directly to the cost 
per mile.  If an emissions tax were feasible, at rate  te  in dollars per gram, then  teEPMi  
would be the extra cost per mile. 
Estimation requires a price for each good that is independent of the amount chosen, 
just as the price per mile above is independent of miles chosen.  We also have a choice 
of vehicle age, but the "price" of holding a new car for one year is higher than the price 
of holding an old car for one year.  We therefore make a nonlinear transformation of 
age to define a quantity with a linear price.  If depreciation is exponential at rate  ￿  per 
year, then  (1–￿)
age  is the fraction left, and we can define  Wear º 1–(1–￿)
age  as the 
fraction  depreciated.    Consumers  holding  a  new  or  used  car  effectively  make  a 
continuous  choice  about  the  amount  of    Wear,    and  they  receive  a  constant 
"reimbursement price"  qi  per unit  Wear  accepted.  And since this choice is separate 
from the discrete choice, we define the annualized price of bundle  ri  as the cost of a 
brand new vehicle.  
The  household’s  direct  utility  is  a  positive  function  of    VMT    and  another 
consumption good  ci , and it is a negative function of  Wear.  Given income  y,  the 
budget constraint is: 
(2)    i i i i i i r y c Wear q VMT p - = + -   . 
where the price of  ci  is normalized to one.  The indirect utility for bundle  i  is a 
function of household income and prices, denoted as  V(y–ri, pi, qi,).   We use a standard 
log-linear demand for  VMT  as a function of prices, income, and observed demographic 
variables  x: 




V i    5 
where the coefficient on the price per mile is bundle-specific,  ￿  is an agent-specific 
error term, and  ki  is the capital cost of the bundle (related to annual cost by  ￿1ki= ￿ri).  
Then the implied indirect utility function is: 
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Using Roy's Identity, this form for indirect utility further implies that the demand for  
Wear is:  






W i   . 
Finally, for two-vehicle households, direct utility is  U(VMTi1, VMTi2, Weari1, Weari2, 
ci).  The budget constraint contains all those quantities (with prices  pi1,  pi2,  qi1,  and  
qi2).  Indirect utility and all four continuous demands have more terms but are analogous 
to equations (3)-(5). 
Following McFadden’s random utility hypothesis, vehicle bundle  i  is chosen if and 
only if:  Vi ￿ Vj  for all  j ￿ i.  We let the random variable ei  have a generalized extreme 
value distribution, so that the discrete choice part becomes the familiar nested logit 
model.  Prior literature estimates discrete and continuous demands sequentially, using 
the predicted shares from the discrete part to correct for endogeneity of vehicle choice 
in  VMT  demands.
5  As pointed out by FFG, however, the same  ￿  and  ￿  parameters 
enter both the indirect utility for estimation of discrete choices and in the continuous 
demands.  In the sequential procedure, estimated parameters of continuous demands are 
not constrained to match the same parameters in the estimated discrete choice model.  
                                                 
5 Jeffrey A. Dubin and Daniel L. McFadden (1984) introduce the sequential procedure for a logit 
model with two appliances (and continuous usage hours).  It is used for vehicle choice and miles by 
Fred Mannering and Clifford Winston (1985), Kenneth Train (1986), Pinelopi K. Goldberg (1998) 
and  West  (2004).      W.  Michael  Hanemann  (1984)  estimates  discrete  and  continuous  choices 
simultaneously, but without unobserved heterogeneity. 
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Often they are quite different.   
FFG introduce a procedure to estimate both parts simultaneously, and they obtain a 
single set of  ￿  and  ￿  parameters.  They also use the estimated parameters to calculate 
various  elasticities,  for  interpretation,  but  they  do  not  undertake  any  simulations  or 
welfare analysis.  Here, we use the estimated parameters from FFG in the indirect utility 
function to measure the dollar value of utility changes from simulated changes in tax 
rates. 
Data  from  the  Consumer  Expenditure  Survey  (CEX,  1996-2001)  for  9027 
households  include  demographic  characteristics,  total  expenditures,  gas  expenditure, 
vehicle type, make, and year.  Fuel prices for each year and region are taken from the 
ACCRA  cost-of-living  indices.    Assuming  20%  depreciation  per  year,    Wear    is 
calculated by the formula above, and current market value of each vehicle  (ki)  is 
calculated  from  original  purchase  price  and  year.    Hedonic  regressions  are  used  to 
impute  missing  values,  and  to  calculate    qi    (the  price  of    Wear).    Data  from  the 
California Air Resources Board (CARB) on 672 vehicles of various types and ages are 
used to estimate  MPGi  and  EPMi  as functions of vehicle type, age, and number of 
cylinders.  Estimated parameters are used to impute MPGi  and  EPMi  for each vehicle 
in the CEX.  Then for each vehicle,  VMT  is calculated by  MPG  times gallons (gas 
expenditure over price  pg). 
II. Results 
The estimates for price and income coefficients in FGG all have the expected signs, 
though they differ in magnitude and significance.  Because the coefficients themselves 
are difficult to interpret, we turn to elasticities.  A 1% increase in the price per mile 
affects all discrete vehicle shares, but the largest shifts are 0.8% less of the car-and-  7 
SUV bundle and 0.7% more of the two-car bundle.  For any given bundle, this 1% 
higher price per mile also reduces miles, but to small extents ranging only from 0.02% 
to 0.07%.  A 1% higher reimbursement price for Wear changes bundle shares slightly; 
given a bundle, desired VMT rises by 0.12 to 0.14%.  Higher income raises the fraction 
of households with both a car and an SUV.   Some capital cost elasticities seem too 
large.  For example, a 1% increase in the cost of an SUV leads to a 7% reduction in the 
one-SUV share and 14% reduction in the two-SUV share (which means that this share 
falls from 14.5% to 12.5% of all households). 
  Here, we calculate implications for emissions.  For simplicity, calculations are 
based on the average household with average income and demographic characteristics, 
but this consumer holds the predicted shares of all six bundles.  We first calculate total 
emissions in the baseline as the sum over all vehicles of  EPM´VMT.  We then calculate 
the changes in behavior from successive increases the gas tax  tg, from the introduction 
of a distance  tax  td, or from an emissions tax  te.  This last tax is not realistic, but useful 
for comparison.  Equation (1) shows how those taxes affect the price per mile.  We also 
simulate a  Wear  tax  tq  (which might shift consumers into new vehicles with low 
EPM).  We calculate the dollar value of changes in utility. 
  To  understand  these  results,  first  note  that  the  calculated    EPM    is  1.89 
grams/mile for the average car and 3.56 for the average SUV.  It also increases to 6.94 
grams/mile for a very old vehicle (with Wear =1).  Thus, any shift from SUV to car or 
to a newer car will affect emissions, even with no change in miles.  Second, note that 
the estimated elasticities for discrete choices are larger than for continuous choices.  A 
higher gas tax raises the price per mile more in an SUV than in a car (because a car has 
higher  MPG).  It has small effect on miles but induces many consumers to switch from   8 
an  SUV  to  a  car  (with  lower    EPM).    Thus  we  expect  that  a  gas  tax  can  reduce 
emissions by more than a tax purely on distance. 
 
Figure 1: The Marginal Cost of Abatement (MCA) for Each Policy 















































   
For any tax, deadweight loss (DWL) generally starts at zero and rises with the 
square of the tax rate.  The marginal cost of abatement (MCA) is defined as the change 
in DWL over the change in emissions, so one might expect the MCA to start at zero and 
to rise at an increasing rate.  Figure 1 shows the MCA curve for each tax, and all curves 
are increasing as expected.
6  Perhaps surprisingly, the MCA curves do not start near 
zero.  The explanation is that the baseline in our model starts with a gasoline tax of 
                                                 
6 Observed emissions are 52,228 grams per household per year, using weights from Fullerton and 
West  (2000)  to  average  over  hydrocarbons,  NOX,  and  carbon  monoxide.    To  get  comparable 
abatement, one curve increases  te  from zero to $25 per 1000 grams (collecting $483 per house-hold 
per year); one increases  tg  from $.374 to $1.50 per gallon ($725); another raises  td  from zero to 
$0.10 per mile ($970); and one raises  tq  from zero to $5000 per unit Wear ($2565).    9 
$.374/gallon, so consumers already have DWL from reduced VMT and altered vehicle 
choices.  Any additional tax that further changes those choices starts with positive costs.  
In Figure 1, the marginal cost of raising the existing gas tax is almost $.02 for the first 
additional gram of abatement, and it rises as choices become further distorted. 
Moreover, the cost of the existing gas tax is the consumer surplus lost from reduced 
driving, and that cost is exacerbated by any tax that further affects distance – such as the 
tax on distance (td) or on emissions (te).  The MCA is lowest for the tax on emissions, as 
predicted by theory.  Compared to the distance tax, the gas tax has lower MCA because 
it raises the price per mile more for any vehicle with low MPG (shifting consumers out 
of SUVs with high EPM). 
Older cars have higher  emissions rates, and the tax on   Wear  (tq) discourages 
holding older cars.
7  Also, FFG estimate that the elasticity of VMT with respect to the 
reimbursement price is 0.12 to 0.14, so the lower reimbursement price means driving 
fewer miles.  Both those changes should reduce emissions.  This tax has the highest 
MCA in Figure 1, however, so it is not very effective in reducing emissions.  Overall, if 
a tax on emissions is not feasible, Figure 1 indicates that the gas tax is more cost-
effective than these other taxes. 
Figure 1 does not compare these taxes to other policies, however.  Further research 
would be necessary to calculate costs of other taxes or even of further mandates like 
those already in place.  For example, future requirements reduce emission rates for 
SUVs.  Given the currently higher SUV emission rates, this model could be used to 
simulate the effects of an annual tax just on older sports utility vehicles (or subsidy for 
their retirement).  More generally, a tax could be collected annually on any vehicle at a 
                                                 
7 It is equivalent to a subsidy for newer vehicles in our model, because it changes relative prices.   10 
rate that is proportional to its emission rate.  Finally, if the ideal emissions tax is not 
feasible, a cost-effective policy might combine this vehicle-EPM tax to change discrete 
choices of vehicles and a gas tax to change continuous choice of miles driven. 
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